Effect of free media on views regarding nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Effect of free media on views regarding
nuclear energy after the Fukushima
accident
Eiji Yamamura
28. July 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32540/
MPRA Paper No. 32540, posted 2. August 2011 12:41 UTC
1 
 
Effect of free media on views regarding nuclear energy 
after the Fukushima accident  
 
Eiji Yamamura

 
 
 
SUMMARY  
 
Using cross-country data, this paper investigates how governance influenced 
views regarding the security of nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident in Japan. 
Key findings are: (1) citizens are less likely to agree that nuclear power plants are 
properly secured against accidents with the presence of a free media and higher levels 
of freedom of expression; and (2) freedom of expression and free media are positively 
associated with the presence of nuclear plants. These findings indicate that sufficient 
information leads citizens to both understand the risk of nuclear energy and to accept 
the existence of nuclear plants. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Japan was struck by one of the largest earthquakes in recorded history on 
March 11, 2011. Following the earthquake, a devastating tsunami arrived at the 
northeastern coast of Japan. The combination of earthquake and tsunami resulted in 
catastrophic damage. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants, located on the coast of 
Fukushima Prefecture in northeastern Japan, were crippled by the disasters, causing 
Japanese citizens to confront the danger of nuclear leakage. Just a month before a 
powerful earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant, government regulators approved 
a 10-year extension for the oldest of the six reactors at the power station despite 
warnings about its safety. Nuclear leakage appears to be caused not only by natural 
disasters but also human error. Political factors are considered to play an important role 
in reducing economic loss when unexpected events occur (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras et al., 
2007).1  The Japanese government, however, provided confusing and inappropriate 
information regarding the Fukushima accident. As a result, citizens distrust the 
Japanese government and have criticized government policy concerning nuclear energy.  
Japan’s nuclear disaster is believed to affect citizens’ perceptions and views 
regarding the security of nuclear energy, not only in Japan but worldwide. 2 
Under-perception about disasters leads to inappropriate actions when preventive 
measures could be taken (Zeckhauser, 1996). Media is considered to play an important 
                                                   
1 As well as political institutions, unwritten social norms also play a key role in saving 
the lives of females and children before males and adults, as in the Titanic disaster 
(Frey et al., 2010; 2011). 
2 Since Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, the security of nuclear energy has 
been at the fore of public attention. More recently, data regarding the long-term effect of 
the Chernobyl disaster has been accumulated, enabling the economic and political 
outcomes of the Chernobyl accident to be analyzed in the field of social science (Danzer 
and Weisshaar 2009; Almond et al. 2009). In Germany, people became more likely to 
worry about the environment after the Chernobyl disaster, even though the disaster did 
not reduce the life satisfaction of German citizens (Berger, 2010). 
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role in economic development (Coyne and Leeson, 2004). Free media has been allowed to 
flourish, contributing to greater political accountability and improving citizens’ 
perceptions. Under such conditions, politicians who are aware that voters are 
well-informed regarding politicians’ activities have a greater incentive to offer benefits 
to all citizens rather than just to small pressure groups (Besley and Burgess, 2002). 
Citizens can also form an informed view regarding the security of nuclear power if 
freedom of media enables citizens to obtain sufficient information. The nuclear energy 
market is considered to lack healthy competition, partly because of rent-seeking 
behavior. For example, a firm may engage in rent-seeking behavior so that the 
government will allow it to operate as a monopoly (Krueger 1974; Tullock 1967). In 
response to that behavior, the government favors the firm. Hence, the government tends 
to conceal negative information regarding the security of nuclear energy. In this 
situation, freedom of media enables citizens to obtain relevant information and to 
therefore determine that nuclear energy is not properly secured. Thus, I propose the 
hypothesis that freedom of media will decrease the likelihood that citizens will agree 
that nuclear power plants are properly secured. 
Using cross-country data collected after the 2011 Japan disaster, this paper 
attempts to examine the above hypothesis. The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Data and empirical strategy are explained in section II. The results of the estimations 
are reported in section III. The final section presents my conclusions. 
 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
WIN-Gallup International (2011) conducted a survey regarding nuclear energy 
approximately 2 weeks after Japan’s natural disaster. Thirty-seven countries were 
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asked ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree that nuclear power plants in your 
country (or near countries) are properly secured against accidents?’ There were five 
response options: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, and 
‘strongly disagree’. Response rates from each county are available from WIN-Gallup 
International (2011).3 The World Bank conducted a World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
project and provided the governance indicator of ‘Voice and Accountability’.4 Kaufmann 
et al. (2010 p. 4) state that ‘Voice and Accountability’ captures the ‘perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.’ The value of 
‘Voice and Accountability’ becomes larger as the country's citizens are more able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media.5 
Table 1 shows the definitions of the variables used in this paper, and their mean 
differences between countries with nuclear plants and those without. SECURE for 
countries with nuclear plants is significantly larger than those without nuclear plants. I 
interpret this result as suggesting that the citizens who live in countries with nuclear 
plants are more likely to believe nuclear energy to be secure and hence support 
pro-nuclear policy. ‘Voice and Accountability’ (MEDIA) for countries with nuclear plants 
is larger than those without plants and the difference is statistically significant. This 
leads me to argue that citizens who obtain appropriate levels of information regarding 
nuclear energy via the media are more inclined to support nuclear energy. 
                                                   
3 List of countries is available upon request from the author. 
4 Data is available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 
April 28, 2011). 
5 Coyne and Leeson (2009) argue that media changes the existing institution. A 
country’s level of media freedom is influenced by media from neighboring countries 
(Sobel et al., 2010). 
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The relationship between SECURE and MEDIA is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows that the governance of media is negatively related to views regarding 
security. China is, however, considered an outlier because 80% of citizens in China agree 
that nuclear energy is properly secured, which is a significantly greater percentage than 
in other countries. For a closer examination, I will investigate causality using 
regression estimations later in the paper. The estimated function of the regression 
analysis takes the following form: 
SECUREi = 0 + 1NUCLEi + 2MEDIAi + 3DISASTi + 4GDPi + 5GOVSIZi 
 + 6EASIAi + uit,  
where SECURE i represents the rate of those agreeing that nuclear plants are secured 
in country i.  represents regression parameters and u is an error term. Independent 
variables are NUCLE, to control for the presence of nuclear plants, and MEDIA, the key 
variable to capture the degree of governance regarding media. The hypothesis proposed 
in the previous section expects the coefficient of MEDIA to take the negative sign. 
DISAST is incorporated to control for the experience of natural disasters because 
experience influences perceptions regarding accidents caused by natural disasters 
(Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006). Economic factors are controlled by the inclusion of GDP 
and GOVSIZ. The location of countries appears to be related with the change in 
perceptions caused by the Japan disaster. Neighboring countries to Japan, such as 
Korea and China, are more likely to be affected by the Japanese accident. For the 
purpose of capturing this effect, EASIA is included. 
Information asymmetry between government (or media) and citizens is thought 
to influence citizens’ views regarding the security of nuclear energy, especially when 
unexpected nuclear incidents occur. ‘Voice and Accountability’ is used as a proxy in this 
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study for the degree of information symmetry between government and citizens in each 
country.  
As seen in Table 1, nuclear energy is likely to exist when people consider nuclear 
energy to be secured. OLS estimation results are believed to suffer from endogeneity 
bias because reverse causality appears to exist between the dependent variable 
SECURE and the independent variable NUCLE. With the aim of controlling for this 
bias, I used instrumental variables to conduct 2SLS estimations. Sufficient land area is 
required to build nuclear energy plants. In addition, it is more difficult to find the space 
to build plants in more densely populated countries. Hence, population density, land 
area, and a log of population are used as instrumental variables for the 2SLS 
estimations. These variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators.6 
 
III. RESULTS 
The OLS estimation results are reported in Table 2. The second stage 2SLS 
results appear in Table 3. Table 4 presents the first stage results of the 2SLS 
estimations. In each table, results using the full sample are reported in columns (1)–(3), 
while results using the sample excluding the outlier (China) are in columns (4)–(6). 
There are a total of 37 observations, reduced to 36 when the outlier (China) is excluded. 
As the sample size is small the jackknife method was used to calculate the standard 
error to ensure that the results were not spurious. 
To follow is a discussion of the OLS estimations. Table 2 shows that NUCLE 
takes the positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. 
After excluding the outlier, the absolute values of NUCLE are approximately 27, 
                                                   
6 The data are available from HP of The World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed March 28, 2011). 
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suggesting that SECURE for countries with nuclear plants is 27% larger than those 
without nuclear plants. MEDIA yields the negative sign and is statistically significant 
in all columns. Hence, freedom of media reduces the rate of citizens’ believing that 
nuclear energy is secure. The absolute values of MEDIA are approximately 0.5 when the 
full sample is used, and approximately 0.4 when China is excluded from the sample. 
This means that an outlier such as China increases the effect of MEDIA on SECURE. 
The significant negative effect of MEDIA, however, continues to exist after removing the 
outlier effect. EASIA is not statistically significant in column (1), but produces a 
significant negative sign in column (4). This suggests that citizens living in a 
neighboring country to Japan are less likely to agree that nuclear energy is secure when 
China is excluded. Other control variables were not statistically significant and they do 
not influence SECURE, with the exception of GDP in columns (3) and (6).  
Looking at the results of the 2SLS estimation shown in Table 3, an 
overidentification test provided a method of testing for exogeneity in the instrumental 
variables. Test statistics are not significant in columns (1)–(6) and thus do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term. 
This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. I see from Table 3 that the sign 
of NUCLE is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. Absolute values of 
NUCLE range from 28.4 to 30.3, which are larger than those in Table 2. MEDIA yields 
the negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns. Absolute 
values range from 0.42 to 0.55, which are almost the same as those in Table 2. 
Concerning the other control variables, and in line with Table 2, the results are not 
statistically significant, with the exception of GDP in columns (3) and (6). Therefore, on 
the whole, the combined results from Tables 2 and 3 lead me to argue that the 
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estimation results are robust when alternative specifications are used.7 
As is exhibited in Table 4, results of the first stage estimation show that ‘land 
area’ and ‘population density’ take the positive and negative signs, in all columns, 
respectively, which is consistent with the proposition, although ‘population density’ is 
not statistically significant. The increasing demand for electricity reflects the growing 
population. The significant positive sign of Ln (population) is believed to reflect that a 
greater demand for electricity is a greater demand for nuclear energy. As with the 
results of the instrumental variables, it is also interesting to observe that MEDIA yields 
the positive sign and is statistically significant. Hence, freedom of media leads citizens 
to support the presence of nuclear energy. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
How a country is to cope in a state of emergency, such as a nuclear disaster, is a 
very important issue. Japan’s example suggests the importance of governance regarding 
disaster information when a state of emergency arises. Furthermore, it is worth 
exploring how freedom of media influences views and perceptions concerning the 
security of nuclear energy against accidents. This study used cross-country data from 37 
countries to examine how freedom of media affected views on the security of nuclear 
energy after the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. After controlling for various 
factors and endogeneity bias, estimation results showed that (1) citizens are less likely 
to agree that nuclear power plants are properly secured against accidents when freedom 
                                                   
7 The World Bank has constructed various measures of quality of governance, such as 
‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’, and ‘control of corruption’. In addition to ‘Voice and 
control’, this paper also examined the effects of other proxy variables as above, 
regarding views on nuclear energy although the results were not reported. No 
significant effects were found. The results are available upon request from the author. 
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of expression and a free media are assured to a greater degree, and (2) freedom of 
expression and free media are positively associated with the presence of nuclear plants.  
Greater freedom of expression and free media are believed to reduce information 
asymmetry between government and citizens. Hence, the findings of this study imply 
that information asymmetry has a critical influence on the presence of nuclear plants as 
well as perceptions regarding the security of nuclear energy against accidents. That is, 
the appropriate information enables citizens to understand more fully the risk of 
nuclear energy, whereas citizens accept the presence of nuclear plants when insufficient 
information has been provided. From this I derive the argument that freedom of media 
enables citizens to calculate the benefits and costs of the presence of nuclear energy, and 
then to properly make an informed decision regarding nuclear policy. 
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Relationship between views regarding security and governance (full sample) 
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Table 1  
Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
SECURE is obtained from WIN-Gallup International (2011). MEDIA is obtained from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed April 28, 2011). NUCLE is collected from HP of European Nuclear 
Society (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). GDP and GOVSIZ are sourced from Penn World Table 
6.3. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed April 30, 2011). DISAST is obtained from the International Disaster 
Database http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 30, 2011).  
 
 Definition With nuclear plants Without nuclear plants. t-statistics 
SECURE Rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) that nuclear 
power plants in your country (or nearby country) are 
properly secured against accidents (%) 
44.0 22.7 4.35*** 
NUCLE Dummy variable for the presence of nuclear plants: 
country having nuclear plants takes 1, otherwise 0 
--- --- --- 
MEDIA Indicator for governance, ‘Voice and Accountability’ of 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) 
71.2 46.8 2.29** 
DISAST Total number of natural disasters since 1970 152.7 49.3 1.85* 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita (million dollars) 2.3 1.5 1.85* 
GOVSIZ 
 
Government expenditure of GDP (%) 15.8 16.9 0.37 
EASIA 
 
Dummies for East Asian countries (China and Korea). --- --- --- 
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Table 2  
OLS estimation; dependent variable: SECURE (rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 27.1*** 
(5.84) 
28.3*** 
(5.17) 
28.5*** 
(5.37) 
 27.0*** 
(6.41) 
26.1*** 
(6.24) 
26.3*** 
(6.47) 
MEDIA –0.48** 
(–2.44) 
–0.51** 
(–2.54) 
–0.54*** 
(–2.91) 
 –0.40*** 
(–2.72) 
–0.39** 
(–2.61) 
–0.42*** 
(–2.96) 
DISAST –0.0001 
(–0.00) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
 –0.01 
(–1.03) 
–0.01 
(–0.97) 
–0.01 
(–0.96) 
GDP 
 
5.41 
(1.33) 
5.81 
(1.43) 
6.57** 
(2.20) 
 4.31 
(1.60) 
4.26 
(1.48) 
5.43** 
(2.70) 
GOVSIZ 
 
–0.14 
(–0.22) 
–0.14 
(–0.24) 
  –0.24 
(–0.57) 
–0.22 
(–0.46) 
 
EASIA 
 
9.78 
(0.24) 
   –11.8*** 
(–3.33) 
  
Constant 
 
39.8*** 
(3.28) 
40.7*** 
(3.44) 
38.0*** 
(5.27) 
 40.3*** 
(4.01) 
39.5*** 
(3.79) 
35.6*** 
(5.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.53  0.45 0.45 0.45 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
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Table 3  
2SLS estimation; dependent variable: SECURE (rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by standard errors obtained by the jackknife method. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area, population density and log of 
population in 2009. These variables are obtained from World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 28.4*** 
(4.06) 
28.5*** 
(3.87) 
29.3*** 
(3.93) 
 29.3*** 
(4.07) 
29.0*** 
(4.54) 
30.3*** 
(4.89) 
MEDIA –0.50*** 
(–2.85) 
–0.52*** 
(–2.82) 
–0.55*** 
(–3.23) 
 –0.43*** 
(–3.31) 
–0.42*** 
(–3.34) 
–0.47*** 
(–3.77) 
DISAST –0.001 
(–0.04) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
 –0.02 
(–1.04) 
–0.02 
(–1.07) 
–0.02 
(–1.15) 
GDP 
 
5.56 
(1.49) 
5.83 
(1.52) 
6.65** 
(2.39) 
 4.61* 
(1.89) 
4.61* 
(1.79) 
5.84*** 
(3.23) 
GOVSIZ 
 
–0.14 
(–0.23) 
–0.14 
(–0.24) 
  –0.24 
(–0.89) 
–0.21 
(–0.48) 
 
EASIA 
 
9.14 
(0.23) 
   –12.9*** 
(–3.13) 
  
Constant 
 
40.0*** 
(3.34) 
40.7* 
(3.42) 
38.1*** 
(5.30) 
 40.5*** 
(4.21) 
39.7*** 
(3.97) 
36.1*** 
(5.83) 
Overidentification 
(Sargan) 
Test 
0.05 
P-value=0.97 
0.04 
P-value=0.97 
0.03 
P-value=0.98 
 0.05 
P-value=0.97 
0.01 
P-value=0.99 
0.07 
P-value=0.96 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.59 0.58  0.54 0.52 0.50 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
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Table 4  
First stage 2SLS estimations presented in Table 3(1) and Table 3(2); dependent variable: NUCLE (country with nuclear energy takes 1, 
otherwise 0)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area, population density, 
and log of population in 2009. These variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version).  
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Land area 0.43* 
(1.87) 
0.40* 
(1.69) 
0.40* 
(1.75) 
 0.43* 
(1.82) 
0.43* 
(1.70) 
0.40* 
(1.76) 
Population density 
  
–0.005 
(–0.07) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
 –0.004 
(–0.06) 
–0.005 
(–0.08) 
–0.005 
(–0.08) 
Ln (population) 
 
0.12** 
(1.91) 
0.13** 
(2.00) 
0.12** 
(2.00) 
 0.12** 
(1.88) 
0.13** 
(2.05) 
0.13** 
(2.13) 
MEDIA 0.01*** 
(2.86) 
0.01** 
(2.54) 
0.01*** 
(2.75) 
 0.01*** 
(2.78) 
0.01*** 
(2.75) 
0.01*** 
(2.96) 
DISAST –0.0004 
(–0.57) 
–0.0001 
(–0.27) 
–0.0001 
(–0.23) 
 –0.0004 
(–0.58) 
–0.0005 
(–0.66) 
–0.0004 
(–0.66) 
GDP 
 
–0.07 
(–0.68) 
–0.05 
(–0.44) 
–0.06 
(–0.61) 
 –0.07 
(–0.68) 
–0.07 
(–0.61) 
–0.07 
(–0.76) 
GOVSIZ 
 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
  0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
 
EASIA 
 
0.48 
(1.56) 
   0.44 
(0.19) 
  
Constant 
 
–1.48** 
(–2.05) 
–1.53** 
(–2.06) 
–1.46** 
(–2.24) 
 –1.58** 
(–2.13) 
–1.58** 
(–2.13) 
–1.54** 
(–2.36) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.38 0.40  0.39 0.39 0.38 
Observations 37 37 37   36  36 36 
